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Income-tax Department
Edited

by

Stephen G. Rusk

Judge Bourquin’s decision, set forth below, affords an interesting com
parison with the rule laid down in article 845 of regulations 45, that “for
the purpose of computing invested capital, federal income and war profits
and excess profits taxes are deemed to have been paid out of the net income
of the taxable year for which they are levied.”
This regulation, it will be remembered, permits the inclusion in invested
capital of a reserve for income and profits taxes until the date or dates when
payment thereof is made.
The judge states that the tax is not a debt in a strict sense, but imme
diately states that the obligation is of a higher nature than a debt, and in
accordance with the latter statement makes the distributees of the corpora
tion’s assets liable to the extent of such distribution for the corporate tax
under the trust fund doctrine.

Any obligation of a corporation of a higher nature than a debt should, of
course, be treated as a liability, and accountants have recognized this prin
ciple when setting up a reserve for income and profits taxes.

This theory has been attacked in many instances where an employee’s
compensation was based upon the net earnings of the employing corporation.
The employee has contended that the tax should not be deducted from net
income in the computation of his compensation, as the tax applied against the
year in which it was levied and not against the year in which the income
accrued upon which the tax was based.
The decision seems to allay any doubt there may be as to when the debt
applies, even though it may be included in invested capital until the time
when it is paid.

(T. D. 3043, July 2, 1920)
Income tax—Retrospective law—Decision of court
1. An income tax may be and was imposed by retrospective law.
2. A tax is not a debt and the government is not a creditor in a strict
sense. The obligation is of a higher nature than a debt.
3. Distributees without consideration of corporate assets, as stockholders
in case of dissolution, are liable to extent of the distribution for corporate tax
under the trust-fund doctrine.
The appended decision of the district court of the United States for the
district of Montana, in the case of United States v. John J. McHatton et al.,
is published for the information of internal revenue officers and others
concerned.
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DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, DISTRICT OF
MONTANA
United States v. John J. McHatton et al. (May 6, 1920)

Bourquin, Judge: Herein, the demurrer to the complaint is overruled.
When the corporation was in being and at dissolution, it owed the duty to
pay all taxes lawfully imposed upon it for income during its life, at any time.
Taxes could be lawfully imposed by retrospective law, and were. If material,
the law speaks of and from a time anterior to the dissolution, takes effect as
though enacted prior to the dissolution. Taxes are not debts, nor govern
ment a creditor, in strict sense. They are of higher nature. But no reason
is perceived why they are not within the principle that those who gratuitously
receive a debtor’s property, to the extent thereof are liable for his debts and
obligations then inchoate or vested, within this principle otherwise known as
the “trust fund’’ doctrine in respect to corporations.
Accordingly, when this corporation without consideration distributed part
of its assets to these defendants, it was under obligation to plaintiff to pay
any taxes that might thereafter be imposed. Defendants received the assets
subject thereto and to the principles aforesaid. The obligation was contin
gent, the plaintiff’s right inchoate. The contingency happened, the right
vested. And the corporation’s assets so distributed may be pursued in the
hands of these defendants by virtue of the principles aforesaid.
In principle the case is very like the Brady case, 240 Fed., 665.

*

*

*

*

The opinion of the attorney general cited in treasury decision No. 3044
is one of the examples of the great injustice wrought by too strict adherence
to the letter of the income and profits tax law.
Here is a company which paid a tax on profits earned in a fiscal year
ended September 30, 1918. The tax exceeded the profits earned in the two
years ended September 30, 1919, because of a non-cancellable contract for
purchase of material the company had at the time of the signing of the
armistice. The value of the material contracted for was greatly reduced
upon the cessation of hostilities, and as a result the company sustained a
loss in its fiscal year ended September 30, 1919, which when added to the
tax it paid on 1918 business resulted in a deficit on the two years’ business.
The story is well told in the following decision, and should be carefully
read by accountants.
The impression we get from a careful reading of the argumentative matter
is that the attorney general interprets the intention of congress to be fully
set forth by the language of the act, but overlooks the fact that it may have
been intended to give relief to taxpayers whose exact condition it could not
foresee.
It is lamentable that congress could not have provided enough administra
tive authority to relieve taxpayers from such conditions as are set forth in
treasury decision No. 3044.
(T. D. 3044, July 9, 1920)

Income tax
Change in taxable year—Loss in inventory—Opinion of attorney general
1. The A company earned a large income during the fiscal year ended
September 30, 1918, and suffered a net loss during the year ended September

199

The Journal of Accountancy
30, 1919. The company in 1920 requested permission to change its accounting
period for 1918 to the calendar-year basis, and then to be allowed to deduct
the net loss from the taxable income for 1918, under section 204, revenue act
of 1918. Held, that the accounting period for which the tax liability had
accrued and the method of accounting during that period were accomplished
facts which could not thereafter be changed by the commissioner.
2. The company further contended that it was entitled to a deduction for
inventory loss under subdivision 14, section 234(a), revenue act of 1918,
because of certain non-cancellable contracts for the future delivery of material
which were not completed by delivery prior to the termination of the fiscal
year, the value of this material having been greatly decreased as a result of
the signing of the armistice on November 11, 1918. Held, that as the com
pany did not own the material on September 30, 1918, but had only a contract
for its purchase, no deduction could be allowed as a loss on inventory based
on such contracts.
Below is given a synopsis of an opinion rendered by the attorney general
on May 28, 1920. The opinion is not to be published in full, as its publication
might disclose unnecessarily the private affairs of the taxpayer. The fol
lowing may be taken as a fair statement of facts to which the ruling
applies:

The A company earned a large income during the fiscal year ended
September 30, 1918, and suffered a net loss during the year ended September
30, 1919. The company is now requesting permission to change its account
ing period for 1918 to the calendar-year basis, and then to be allowed to
deduct a net loss for 1919 from the taxable income for 1918, under section
204, revenue act of 1918. As an alternative, it contends that it is entitled
to a deduction for inventory loss under subdivision 14 of section 234(a),
revenue act of 1918, because of certain non-cancellable contracts for the
delivery of X material, which were not completed by the delivery of the X
material prior to the termination of the fiscal year, the value of this material
having been very greatly decreased as a result of the armistice signed on
November 11, 1918. The commissioner of internal revenue has ruled that he
is without power to now allow the requested change in an accounting period
for 1918, or to allow the deduction for inventory loss. The company in its
manufacture uses unusually large quantities of certain material. During the
war the company’s plant was entirely devoted to war production. In August,
1918, acting upon information obtained that there would be a shortage in X
material, and that it was important therefore for the company to buy for
its current needs, this company entered into contracts for the future delivery
of a large quantity of such material, the quantity ordered being reasonably
necessary for a six months’ supply on the basis of the then current govern
ment demand for its product. On the signing of the armistice the market
price of this material fell to a very low figure. The company’s contracts were
legally binding and non-cancellable, and as a result the company, subsequent
to November 11, 1918, suffered a loss on these contracts. The company’s
taxable year ended September 30, 1918. Its earnings for that year were
considerable and the tax levied thereon correspondingly large. In making
its tax return the company paid a portion of the tax assessed and filed a claim
in abatement for the balance, asking that this claim be allowed as a loss on
inventory, because of this loss on X material arising from contracts made
during 1918. This claim was denied by the income-tax unit apparently on the
ground that the claim could not be treated as a loss on inventory, because X
material contracts for future delivery entered into in 1918 were not inven
toried September 30, 1918.
Since its claim was denied the company’s 1919 taxable year ended
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September 30, 1919. It later definitely ascertained that during its taxable
year 1919 the company suffered an operating loss, a large part of which was
due to the money losses actually suffered on the above-mentioned X material
contracts of 1918. Coupling together these two taxable years in this manner
the company’s tax would exceed the earnings for these two years. The
fiscal year ending September 30 had been determined and fixed at the time
of its incorporation in 1912, and section 204(b) was enacted subsequent to
the date when, under existing regulations, it could have secured a change in
its accounting period. Attention was directed to the fact that the company
incurred its losses on these contracts, not because of any error of business
judgment, but because it acted upon the information which it received from
the War Industries Board and in a desire to hasten production. Further,
because of the slowness with which the material was being delivered it was
not possible to make contracts therefor containing cancellation privileges, nor
was it possible to obtain deliveries short of several months after order.
Upon substantially these facts the following questions were submitted
to the attorney general:
First. Does the statute authorize the commissioner to approve a change
by this company at this time (January, 1920) in its accounting records for
the fiscal year ended September 30, 1918, so that its accounting period for
1918 will be changed to a calendar-year basis, solely because of a tax ad
vantage ?
Second. Are the regulations promulgated by the commissioner with the
approval of the secretary, requiring notice of a change of accounting periods
and forbidding retroactive changes, valid regulations?
Third. Does the statute authorize a deduction by this company under
section 234(a), subdivision 14, by treating this loss on the X material con
tracts as a loss which is of the “character” of an inventory loss?
The attorney general disposed of the questions as follows:
It will be seen that the company’s taxes for 1918 have been assessed upon
the basis of its return made as of September 30, 1918, the close of its fiscal
year. In other words, its taxes have been assessed on the basis of its financial
condition on that date as compared with its financial condition twelve months
previously. The result reached was based—in part, of course—upon an
inventory of all its property owned at that date. It then had outstanding
contracts for the purchase and delivery of X material to be used in its
manufacturing operations during succeeding months. The amounts which
would be payable under these contracts upon delivery of the X material were
not listed as liabilities, nor was the X material which was to be thereafter
delivered included in the inventory of property owned by the company. At
that time the war was in progress. The company was not using X material
in carrying out contracts with the government. It was, however, using it in
the manufacture of articles which were sold to and used by others who had
war contracts with the government. The immediate demand for and value
of the products in which X material was used depended very largely upon
the continuance of the war. When the armistice was signed in November
this demand ceased and the value of the X material which the company had
contracted to buy immediately dropped, making it inevitable that when the
X material should be delivered and paid for a heavy loss would immediately
ensue.
It is clear that the assessment was made upon a return which clearly
reflected the income and profits of the company on September 30, 1918. The
theory of the income-tax laws is that income and profits are to be determined
and taxed annually. Ordinarily, therefore, when he pays taxes for a given
year upon the net income shown by a proper accounting at the end of that
year he is not entitled to relief even though it happens that he suffers a net
loss during the succeeding year in excess of the net income for the first year.
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The revenue act of 1918 was not, in fact, passed until February, 1919.
During the time that it was under consideration by congress the armistice
had been signed. There were many individuals and corporations in the
country conducting business requiring large capital and dependent in large
measure upon the continuation of the war. It was therefore obvious when
the act was passed that much property—such as plants, buildings, machinery
and equipment valuable for war work—had been at once greatly reduced in
value by the signing of the armistice. It was also evident that business
profitable because of the war would, in many instances, be conducted, if at
all, during the following year at a loss. Congress apparently felt that persons
and corporations so situated should be given some relief. Accordingly, sec
tion 204(b) is as follows:
“If for any taxable year beginning October 31, 1918, and ending prior to
January 1, 1920, it appears upon the production of evidence satisfactory to
the commissioner that any taxpayer has sustained a net loss, the amount of
such net loss shall, under regulations prescribed by the commissioner, with
the approval of the secretary, be deducted from the net income of the tax
payer for the preceding taxable year; and the taxes imposed by this title and
Title III for such preceding taxable year shall be redetermined accordingly."
Net loss as used in this provision is defined in section 204(a) to be only
“net losses resulting from either (1) the operation of any business regularly
carried on by the taxpayer, or (2) the bona fide sale by the taxpayer of
plant, buildings, machinery, equipment, or other facilities, constructed, in
stalled, or acquired by the taxpayer on or after April 6, 1917, for the pro
duction of articles contributing to the prosecution of the present war.” It
will be seen that this relief was not extended to all corporations which had
been assessed for taxes during the year 1918, but is limited to those whose
fiscal or tax year began after October 31, 1918. Apparently, so far as this
provision was concerned, congress decided to leave without relief those
individuals and corporations whose taxes for 1918 had been assessed upon
the basis of a tax year ending prior to the date mentioned—that is, prior
to the month in which the armistice was signed. The fiscal or tax year of
the A company ended September 30, 1918. It clearly, therefore, did not come
within the terms of section 204, and the question is whether it can now be
permitted to bring itself within the terms of that section by changing its
accounting period or tax year.
Section 212 of the act of 1918, applying to individuals, but made applicable
to corporations by section 232, provides:
“(b) The net income shall be computed upon the basis of the tax
payer’s annual accounting period (fiscal year or calendar year, as the case
may be) in accordance with the method of accounting regularly employed in
keeping the books of such taxpayer; but if no such method of accounting
has been so employed, or if the method employed does not clearly reflect
the income, the computation shall be made upon such basis and in such
manner as in the opinion of the commissioner does clearly reflect the income.
If the taxpayer’s annual accounting period is other than a fiscal year, as
defined in section 200, or if the taxpayer has no annual accounting period or
does not keep books, the net income shall be computed on the basis of the
calendar year.
“If a taxpayer changes his accounting period from fiscal year to calendar
year, from calendar year to fiscal year, or from one fiscal year to another,
the net income shall, with the approval of the commissioner, be computed
on the basis of such new accounting period, subject to the provisions of
section 226.”
This clearly expresses the purpose that if there is in the conduct of a
business a regular accounting period the tax shall be computed for that period
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and in accordance with the method of accounting regularly employed in keep
ing the books of the taxpayer, provided that method of bookkeeping clearly
reflects the income. If the income is not thus clearly reflected, the commis
sioner is given authority to compute the tax in such manner as will clearly
reflect the income. I am of opinion, however, that whether the regular method
of keeping the books or some other method of computation is made the basis
it is compulsory that the taxes be computed for the taxpayer’s regular ac
counting period.
The A company’s regular accounting period ended September 30, 1918.
The assessment against it was made for a period of twelve months ending
on that date, and was presumably based upon the method of accounting
regularly employed by the company in keeping its books. The act of 1918
was not passed until some months after this date. The accounting period
for which the tax liability had accrued, and the method of accounting during
that period were accomplished facts which, in the very nature of things,
could not thereafter be changed. Congress, of course, might have authorized
a change and directed a recomputation of the taxes, but it did not do so.
On the contrary, I think it clear that by limiting the relief granted by section
204 to taxpayers whose tax year should begin after October 31, 1918, it un
equivocally expressed the intent that no taxpayer whose tax year for 1919
began prior to that date should take any benefit under section 204. To permit
now, therefore, a change in the accounting period for 1918 of this_company
would be to bring it within the terms of section 204 in the face of the ex
pressed intent of congress that the section should not apply to it. I am of
the opinion that the commissioner is without power to permit the change of
the accounting period as requested by the company.
Section 204, however, does not contain all the relief which congress
thought should be given on account of losses resulting from the armistice.
Section 234 (14) is as follows:
“(a) At the time of filing return for the taxable year 1918 a taxpayer
may file a claim in abatement based on the fact that he has sustained a sub
stantial loss (whether or not actually realized by sale or other disposition)
resulting from any material reduction (not due to temporary fluctuation) of
the value of the inventory for such taxable year, or from the actual payment
after the close of such taxable year of rebates in pursuance of contracts
entered into during such year upon sales made during such year. * * *
(b) If no such claim is filed, but it is shown to the satisfaction of the com
missioner that during the taxable year 1919 the taxpayer has sustained a
substantial loss of the character above described, then the amount of such
loss shall be deducted from the net income for the taxable year 1918, and
the taxes imposed by this title and by title III for such year shall be re
determined accordingly.”
This section, unlike section 204, applies to all corporations paying taxes
for the year 1918. In the scope of the relief granted, however, it is narrower
than that section. It permits a deduction from the net income shown for
the year 1918 not of all losses sustain 1 during the year 1919, but only such
as result either from (1) a material reduction of the value of the inventory
for the tax year 1918, or (2) from the actual payment after the close of the
tax year 1918 of rebates in pursuance of contracts entered into during that
year upon sales made during that year. On September 30, 1918, none of
the X material on account of which losses were subsequently sustained had
been delivered to the company, and hence none was included in the inventory
on which the assessment for 1918 was made. The company did not at that
time own this X material, and presumably much of it had not even been
produced. The company did not own it but only had a contract for its pur
chase. It could not, therefore, have properly been included in an inventory
of the company’s property as of that date. It is not, as I understand, insisted
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that if subsection 14(a) stood alone, the loss on this X material could be
allowed as a reduction of the value of the inventory for 1918, but it is in
sisted that subsection 14(b) is broader in its scope, and that the expression
therein “loss of the character above described” includes such a loss as that
sustained on this X material. I am unable to agree with this insistence.
Subsection 14(a) specifically describes the losses for which deductions may
be made, and when (b) of the same subsection speaks of a “loss of the
character above described,” I do not think the language can be construed
to include anything which is not included in (a). This view seems to me
unavoidable when it is remembered that (a) provides for a claim in abate
ment to be made at the time of the filing of a return for 1918, that the act
was not passed until February, 1919, after the time of many taxpayers for
filing a return for 1918 had expired and after it was impossible for such
taxpayers to file a claim in abatement at the time of filing their return. The
provision in (b) was obviously for the benefit of taxpayers who had filed
their returns before the act was passed, or who thereafter for any reason
failed to file a claim in abatement at the time of filing returns. The two
provisions manifestly apply to exactly the same losses, and these are spe
cifically described in (a). The loss for which a deduction is now claimed
does not consist of a reduction in the value of the inventory upon which the
taxes for 1918 were assessed, and I am constrained to the opinion that it does
not come within the terms of section 234 (14).
Answering the questions submitted specifically, I advise:
First: The statute does not authorize the commission to approve a
change by this company at this time in its accounting records for the fiscal
year ending September 30, 1918, so that its accounting period for 1918 will
be changed to a calendar-year basis.
Second. The answer to question 1 is conclusive of this company’s right
to now change its accounting period for 1918, and a specific answer to
question 2, which would involve a more extended examination of the regula
tions referred to, would therefore seem to be unnecessary.
Third. The statute does not authorize a deduction by this company under
section 234, subcivision 14, by treating the loss on the X material contracts
as a loss which is of the character of an inventory loss.
Supreme court decisions are always edifying, and the one embodying
treasury decision No. 3045 is especially so, even though voluminous.
It seems that if one deducts a dividend from the amount of his annual life
insurance premium and remits to his insurance company the net amount, the
company need not include the dividend as taxable income, but if one remits
the total amount of the premium and the company then remits to him the
amount of the dividend, the company must include the amount of the dividend
as taxable income.
This fact, together with many others of interest with reference to mutual
life insurance companies, will be found in the following decision, and we
recommend a careful reading of the opinion of the United States supreme
court delivered by Justice Brandeis.
This opinion was rendered upon an action brought under the law of
October 3, 1913:
(T. D. 3046, July 19, 1920)

Income tax—Act, October 3, 1913—Decision of supreme court

1.

Excess in Premium
It is of the essence of mutual insurance that the excess in the pre
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mium over the actual cost as later ascertained shall be returned to the
policyholder.

2.

Premium Receipts Excluded from Gross Income.
Section II G (b) of the act of October 3, 1913, excludes from
gross income those premium receipts which are actually or in effect
paid by applying dividends.

3.

Basis of Exclusion.
The congress used the words “shall not include” as applied to the
annually ascertained over-payments of premium paid back or credited
to the policyholder, because it eliminated them from the aggregate of
taxable premiums as being the equivalent of abatement of premiums.

4.

Object of the Noninclusion Clause.
The noninclusion clause in the act of October 3, 1913, was framed
to define what amounts involved in dividends should be “nonincluded”
or deducted, and thus to prevent any controversy arising over the
questions which had been raised under the act of 1909. (See
Mutual Benefit Life Insurance Co. v. Herold, 198 Fed., 199.)

5.

Receipts of Net Premiums the Basis of Taxation.
Congress has acted with entire consistency in laying down the rule
by which in computing gross earnings certain amounts only are
excluded. The principle applied is that of basing the taxation on
receipts of net premiums, instead of on gross premiums. The amount
equal to the aggregate of certain dividends is excluded, although
they are dividends, because by reason of their application the net
premium receipts of the tax year are to that extent less.

6.

Fraternal Life Insurance.
Fraternal life insurance has been exempted from all income taxa
tion because, as originally devised, it had in it only the element of
protection. The premiums paid by the member were supposed to be
sufficient, and only sufficient, to pay the losses which fell within the
current year.

7.

Source of Dividend.
The dividend of a life insurance company is made possible be
cause the amounts paid in as premium have earned more than it was
assumed that they would when the policy contract was made, or
because the expense of conducting the business was less than it was
then assumed it would be, or because the mortality—that is, the
deaths in the class to which the policyholder belongs—proved to be
less than had then been assumed in fixing the premium rate.

8.

Paid-up Policies.
After a policy is paid up the element of investment predominates,
and congress might reasonably regard the dividends substantially as
profit on the investment.

9.

Deferred Dividend Policy.
In the case of a deferred dividend policy the dividend represents
in part what clearly could not be regarded as a repayment of excess
premium of the policyholder receiving the dividend, for the “share of
the forfeiture” which he receives is the share of the redundancy in
premium of other policyholders who did not persist in premium pay
ments to the end of the contract period.
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10.

Fraternal Beneficiary Societies.
Congress exempted certain co-operative enterprises from all in
come taxation, but, with the exception of fraternal beneficiary
societies, it imposed in express terms such taxation upon “every in
surance company.”

11.

Participating Policies Issued by Stock Life Insurance Companies.
The participating policies commonly issued by stock life insurance
companies are, both in rights conferred and in financial results, sub
stantially the same as the policies issued by purely mutual life in
surance companies.

12. Legislative History as an Aid to Construction.
The legislative history of an act may, when the meaning of the
words used is doubtful, be resorted to as an aid to construction; but
no aid can possibly be derived from legislative history of another
act passed nearly six years after the one in question.
13. Judgment Affirmed.
The judgment of the circuit court of appeals is affirmed.
The appended decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in
the case of the Penn Mutual Life Insurance Company v. Ephraim Lederer,
collector of internal revenue, is published for the information of internal
revenue officers and others concerned.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES.
OCTOBER TERM, 1919

No. 499.

The Penn Mutual Life Insurance Company, petitioner v. Ephraim Lederer,
collector of internal revenue

On Writ of Certiorari to the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit
[April 19, 1920]

Mr. Justice Brandeis delivered the opinion of the court:
The Penn Mutual Life Insurance Company, a purely mutual legal reserve
company which issues level-premium insurance, brought this action in the
district court of the United States for the eastern district of Pennsylvania
to recover $6,865.03, which was assessed and collected as an income tax of
1 per cent upon the sum of $686,503, alleged to have been wrongly included
as a part of its gross income, and hence also of its net income, for the period
from March 1, 1913, to December 31, 1913. The latter sum equals the aggre
gate of the amounts paid during that period by the company to its policyholders in cash dividends which were not used by them during that period
in payment of premiums. The several amounts making up this aggregate
represent mainly a part of the so-called redundancy in premiums paid by the
respective policyholders in some previous year or years. They are, in a sense,
a repayment of that part of the premium previously paid, which experience
has proved was in excess of the amount which had been assumed would be
required to meet the policy obligations (ordinarily termed losses) or the
legal reserve and the expense of conducting the business.1 The district court
allowed recovery of the full amount with interest. (247 Fed., 559.) The
circuit court of appeals for the third circuit, holding that nothing was re
1 The manner in which mutual level-premium life insurance companies conduct their
business and the nature and application of dividends are fully set forth in Mutual
Benefit Life Ins. Co. v. Herold (198 Fed., 199); Connecticut General Life Ins. Co. v.
Eaton (218 Fed., 188); Connecticut Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Eaton (218 Fed., 206).
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coverable except a single small item, reversed the judgment and awarded a
new trial. (258 Fed., 81.) A writ of certiorari from this court was then
allowed. (250 U. S., 656.)
Whether the plaintiff is entitled to recover depends wholly upon the con
struction to be given certain provisions in section II G (b) of the revenue
act of October 3, 1913, c. 16 (38 Stat, 114, 172, 173). The act enumerates
among the corporations upon which the income tax is imposed, “every in
surance company” “other than fraternal beneficiary societies, orders or asso
ciations operating under the lodge system or for the exclusive benefit of the
members of a fraternity itself operating under a lodge system.” It provides
(G (b) pp. 172-174) how the net income of insurance companies shall be
ascertained for purposes of taxation, prescribing what shall be included to
determine the gross income of any year, and also specifically what deductions
from the ascertained gross income shall be made in order to determine the
net income upon which the tax is assessed. Premium receipts are a part of
the gross income to be accounted for.
In applying to insurance companies the system of income taxation in which
the assessable net income is to be ascertained by making enumerated deduc
tions from the gross income (including premium receipts), congress naturally
provided how, in making the computation,2 repayment of the redundancy in
the premium should be dealt with. In a mutual company, whatever the field
of its operation, the premium exacted is necessarily greater than the expected
cost of the insurance, as the redundancy in the premium furnishes the
guaranty fund out of which extraordinary losses may be met, while in a stock
company they may be met from the capital stock subscribed. It is of the
essence of mutual insurance that the excess in the premium over the actual
cost as later ascertained shall be returned to the policyholder. Some payment
to the policyholder representing such excess is ordinarily made by every
mutual company every year; but the so-called repayment or dividend is rarely
made within the calendar year in which the premium (of which it is sup
posed to be the unused surplus) was paid. Congress treated the so-called
repayments or dividends in this way (p. 173) :
(a) Mutual fire companies “shall not return as income any portion of
the premium deposits returned to their policyholders.”
(b) Mutual marine companies “shall be entitled to include in deductions
from gross income amounts repaid to policyholders on account of premiums
previously paid by them and interest paid upon such amounts between the
ascertainment thereof and the payment thereof.”
(c) Life insurance companies—that is, both stock and strictly mutual—
“shall not include as income in any year such portion of any actual premium
received from any individual policyholder as shall have been paid back or
credited to such individual policyholder, or treated as an abatement of pre
mium of such individual policyholder, within such year.”
(d) For all insurance companies, whatever their field of operation, and
whether stock or mutual, the act provides that there be deducted from gross
income “the net addition, if any, required by law to be made within the year
to reserve funds and the sums other than dividends paid within the year on
policy and annuity contracts.”
The government contends, in substance, for the rule that in figuring the
gross income of life insurance companies there shall be taken the aggregate
2 The percentage of the redundancy to the premium varies from year to year greatly
in the several fields of insurance, and likewise in the same year in the several companies
in the same field. Where the margin between the probable losses and those reasonably
possible is very large, the return premiums rise often to 90 per cent or more of the
premium paid. This is true of the manufacturers’ mutual fire insurance companies of
New England. See Report Massachusetts Insurance Commissioner (1913), Vol. I, p. 16.

207

The Journal of Accountancy
of the year’s net premium receipts made up separately for each policyholder.3
The Penn Mutual Company contends for the rule that in figuring the gross
income there shall be taken the aggregate full premiums received by the
company less the aggregate of all dividends paid by it to any policyholder by
credit upon a premium or by abatement of a premium, and also of all divi
dends whatsoever paid to any policyholder in cash whether applied in pay
ment of a premium or not. The noninclusion clause (c) above excludes from
gross income those premium receipts which were actually or in effect paid
by applying dividends. The company seeks to graft upon the clause so re
stricted a provision for what it calls nonincluding, but which, in fact, is
deducting all cash dividends not so applied. In support of this contention the
company relies mainly, not upon the words of the statute, but upon arguments
which it bases upon the nature of mutual insurance, upon the supposed
analogy of the rules prescribed in the statute for mutual fire and marine
companies, and upon the alleged requirements of consistency:
First. The reason for the particular provision made by congress seems
to be clear: dividends may be made, and by many of the companies have
been made largely by way of abating or reducing the amount of the renewal
premium.4 Where the dividend is so made the actual premium receipt of the
year is obviously only the reduced amount. But, as a matter of bookkeeping,
the premium is entered at the full rate and the abatement—that is, the
amount by which it was reduced—is entered as a credit. The financial result
both to the company and to the policyholders is, however, exactly the same
whether the renewal premium is reduced by a dividend or whether the renewal
premium remains unchanged, but is paid in part either by a credit or by cash
received as a dividend. And the entries in bookkeeping would be substan
tially the same, because the several ways of paying a dividend are, as
between the company and the policyholder, financial equivalents. Congress
doubtless concluded to make the incidence the same also as respects income
taxation. Where the dividend was used to abate or reduce the full or gross
premium, the direction to eliminate from the apparent premium receipts is
aptly expressed by the phrase “shall not include” used in clause (c) above.
Where the premium was left unchanged, but was paid in part by a credit or
cash derived from the dividend, the instruction would be more properly ex
pressed by a direction to deduct those credits. Congress doubtless used the
words “shall not include” as applied also to these credits, because it eliminated
them from the aggregate of taxable premiums as being the equivalent of
abatement of premiums.
That such was the intention of congress is confirmed by the history of the
noninclusion clause (c) above. The provision in the revenue act of 1913 for
taxing the income of insurance companies is in large part identical with the
provision for the special excise tax upon them imposed by the act of August
5, 1909, chapter 6, section 38, 36 Statutes, 112. By the latter act the net in
come of insurance companies was also to be ascertained by deducting from
gross income “sums other than dividends paid within the year on policy and
renewal contracts,” but there was in that act no noninclusion clause whatso
3 A separate account is kept by the company with each policyholder. In that
account there are entered each year the charges of the premiums payable and all credits,
either for cash payments or by way of credit of dividends or by way of abatement of
premium.
4 The dividend provision of the Mutual Benefit Life Insurance Co. involved in the
Herold case, supra (198 Fed., 199, 204), was in part: “After this policy shall have been
in force one year, each year’s premium subsequently paid shall be subject to reduction
by such dividends as may be apportioned by the directors.’’ The dividend provision in
some of the participating policies involved in the Connecticut General Life Insurance
Co. case, supra (218 Fed., 188, 192), was: “Reduction of premiums as determined by
the company will be made annually beginning at the second year, or the insured may
pay the full premium and instruct the company to apply the amount of the reduction
apportioned to him in any one of the following plans:” (Then follow four plans.)
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ever. The question arose whether the provision in the act of 1913, identical
with (c) above, prevented using in the computation the reduced renewal pre
miums instead of the full premiums, where the reduction in the premium had
been effected by means of dividends. In Mutual Benefit Life Insurance Com
pany v. Herold (198 Fed., 199), decided July 29, 1912, it was held that the
renewal premium as reduced by such dividends should be used in computing
the gross premium; and it was said (p. 212) that dividends so applied in
reduction of renewal premiums “should not be confused with dividends de
clared in the case of a full-paid participating policy wherein the policyholder
has no further premium payments to make. Such payments having been duly
met, the policy has become at once a contract of insurance and of investment.
The holder participates in the profits and income of the invested funds of the
company.” On writ of error sued out by the government the judgment
entered in the district court was affirmed by the circuit court of appeals
on January 27, 1913 (201 Fed., 918) ; but that court stated that it refrained
from expressing any opinion concerning dividends on full-paid policies,
saying that it did so “not because we wish to suggest disapproval, but merely
because no opinion about these matters is called for now, as they do not seem
to be directly involved.” The noninclusion clause in the revenue act of 1913
(c) above was doubtless framed to define what amounts involved in divi
dends should be “nonincluded” or deducted, and thus to prevent any con
troversy arising over the questions which had been raised under the act of
1909.5 The petition for writ of certiorari applied for by the government was
not denied by this court until December 15, 1913 (231 U. S., 755)—that is,
after the passage of the act.
Second. It is argued that the nature of life insurance dividends is the
same, whatever the disposition made of them, and that congress could not
have intended to relieve the companies from taxation to the extent that
dividends are applied in payment of premiums and to tax them to the extent
that dividends are not so applied. If congress is to be assumed to have in
tended, in obedience to the demands of consistency, that all dividends declared
under life insurance policies should be treated alike in connection with income
taxation regardless of their disposition, the rule of consistency would require
deductions more far-reaching than those now claimed by the company. Why
allow so-called noninclusion of amounts equal to the dividends paid in cash
but not applied in reduction of renewal premium and disallow so-called non
inclusion of amounts equal to the dividends paid by a credit representing
amounts retained by the company for accumulation or to be otherwise used
for the policyholders’ benefit ? The fact is, that congress has acted with entire
consistency in laying down the rule by which in computing gross earnings
certain amounts only are excluded; but the company has failed to recognize
what the principle is which congress has consistently applied. The principle
applied is that of basing the taxation on receipts of net premiums instead
of on gross premiums. The amount equal to the aggregate of certain divi
dends is excluded, although they are dividends, because by reason of their
application the net premium receipts of the tax year are to that extent less.
There is a striking difference between an aggregate of individual premiums,
each reduced by means of dividends, and an aggregate of full premiums, from
which it is sought to deduct amounts paid out by the company which have no
relation whatever to premiums received within the tax year but which relate
to some other premiums which may have been received many years earlier.
The difference between the two cases is such as may well have seemed to
congress sufficient to justify the application of different rules of taxation.
There is also a further significance. All life insurance has in it the
5 Substantially the same questions were involved also in Connecticut General Life
Ins. Co. v. Eaton (218 Fed., 188), and Connecticut Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Eaton (218
Fed., 206), in which decisions were not, however, reached until the following year.

209

The Journal of Accountancy
element of protection. That afforded by fraternal beneficiary societies, as
originally devised, had in it only the element of protection. There the pre
miums paid by the member were supposed to be sufficient, and only sufficient,
to pay the losses which will fall during the current year, just as premiums in
fire, marine or casualty insurance are supposed to cover only the losses of the
year or other term for which the insurance is written. Fraternal life in
surance has been exempted from all income taxation, congress having dif
ferentiated these societies, in this respect as it had in others, from ordinary
life insurance companies. Compare Royal Arcanum Supreme Council v.
Behrend (247 U. S., 394). But in level-premium life insurance, while the
motive for taking it may be mainly protection, the business is largely that of
savings investment. The premium is in the nature of a savings deposit.
Except where there are stockholders, the savings bank pays back to the de
positor his deposit with the interest earned less the necessary expense of man
agement. The insurance company does the same, the difference being merely
that the savings bank undertakes to repay to each individual depositor the
whole of his deposit with interest, while the life insurance company under
takes to pay to each member of a class the average amount (regarding the
chances of life and death) ; so that those who do not reach the average age
get more than they have deposited—that is, paid in premiums (including in
terest)—and those who exceed the average age less than they deposited
(including interest). The dividend of a life insurance company may be re
garded as paying back part of these deposits called premiums. The dividend
is made possible because the amounts paid in as premium have earned more
than it was assumed they would when the policy contract was made, or be
cause the expense of conducting the business was less than it was then
assumed it would be, or because the mortality—that is, the deaths in the class
to which the policyholder belongs—proved to be less than had been assumed
in fixing the premium rate. When for any or all of these reasons the net cost
of the investment—that is, the right to receive at death or at the endowment
date the agreed sum—has proved to be less than that for which provision was
made, the difference may be regarded either as profit on the investment or as
a saving in the expense of the protection. When the dividend is applied in
reduction of the renewal premium, congress might well regard the element
of protection as predominant and treat the reduction of the premium paid
by means of a dividend as merely a lessening of the expense of protection.
But after the policy is paid up the element of investment predominates, and
congress might reasonably regard the dividend substantially as profit on the
investment.
The dividends, aggregating $686,503, which the Penn Mutual Company
insists should have been “nonincluded,” or more properly deducted, from the
gross income, were in part dividends on the ordinary limited-payment life
policies which had been paid up. There are others which arose under policy
contracts in which the investment feature is more striking; for instance, the
accelerative endowment policy or such special form of contract as the 25-year
“6 per cent investment bond,” matured and paid March, 1913, on which the
policyholder received, besides dividends, interest and a “share of forfeitures.”
In the latter, as in “deferred dividend” and other semi-tontine policies, the
dividend represents in part what clearly could not be regarded as a repayment
of excess premium of the policyholder receiving the dividend. For the “share
of the forfeiture” which he receives is the share of the redundancy in pre
mium of other policyholders who did not persist in premium payments to the
end of the contract period.
Third. The noninclusion clause here in question (c) above, is found in
section II G (b) in juxtaposition to the provisions concerning mutual fire and
mutual marine companies, clauses (a) and (b) above. The fact that in three
separate clauses three different rules are prescribed by congress for the treat
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ment of redundant premiums in the three classes of insurance would seem to
be conclusive evidence that congress acted with deliberation and intended to
differentiate between them in respect to income taxation. But the company,
ignoring the differences in the provisions concerning fire and marine com
panies, respectively, insists that mutual life insurance rests upon the same
principles as mutual fire and marine, and that as the clauses concerning fire
and marine companies provide specifically for noninclusion in or deduction
from gross income of all portions of premiums returned, congress must have
intended to apply the same rule to all. Neither premise nor conclusion is
sound.
Mutual fire, mutual marine, and mutual life insurance companies are
analogous, in that each performs the service called insuring wholly for the
benefit of their policyholders, and not like stock insurance companies, in part
for the benefit of persons who, as stockholders, have provided working capital
on which they expect to receive dividends representing profits from their
investment. In other words, these mutual companies are alike in that they
are co-operative enterprises. But in respect to the service performed, fire and
marine companies differ fundamentally, as above pointed out, from legal
reserve life companies. The thing for which a fire or marine insurance pre
mium is paid is protection, which ceases at the end of the term. If, after the
end of the term, a part of the premium is returned to the policyholder, it is
not returned as something purchased with the premium, but as a part of the
premium which was not required to pay for the protection—that is, the
expense was less than estimated. On the other hand, the service performed
in level-premium life insurance is both protection and investment. Premiums
paid—not in the tax year, but perhaps a generation earlier—have earned so
much for the co-operators that the company is able to pay to each not only
the agreed amount but also additional sums called dividends; and have earned
these additional sums in part at least by transactions not among the mem
bers, but with others, as by lending the money of the co-operators to third
persons who pay a larger rate of interest than it was assumed would be
received on investments. The fact that the investment resulting in accumula
tion or dividend is made by a co-operative as distinguished from a capitalistic
concern does not prevent the amount thereof being properly deemed a profit
on the investment. Nor does the fact that the profit was earned by a co
operative concern afford basis for the argument that congress did not intend
to tax the profit. Congress exempted certain co-operative enterprises from all
income taxation, among others mutual savings banks; but with the exception
of fraternal beneficiary societies it imposed in express terms such taxation
upon “every insurance company.”6
The purpose of congress to differentiate between mutual fire and marine
insurance companies on the one hand and life insurance companies on the
other is further manifested by this: The provision concerning return pre
miums in computation of the gross income of fire and marine insurance com
panies is limited in terms to mutual companies, whereas the noninclusion
clause (c) above, relating to life insurance companies, applies whether the
company be a stock or a mutual one. There is good reason to believe that
the failure to differentiate between stock and mutual life insurance com
panies was not inadvertent. For while there is a radical difference between
stock fire and marine companies and mutual fire and marine companies, both
in respect to the conduct of the business and in the results to policyholders,
the participating policy commonly issued by the stock life insurance company
is, both in rights conferred and in financial results, substantially the same
6 The alleged unwisdom and injustice of taxing mutual life insurance companies
while mutual savings banks were exempted had been strongly pressed upon congress.
Briefs and statements filed with senate committee on finance on H. R. 3321, sixty-third
congress, first session, vol. 3, pp. 1955-2094.
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as the policy issued by a purely mutual life insurance company. The real
difference between the two classes of life companies as now conducted lies
in the legal right of electing directors and officers. In the stock company
stockholders have that right; in the mutual companies, the policyholders, who
are the members of the corporation.
The Penn Mutual Company, seeking to draw support for its argument
from legislation subsequent to the revenue act of 1913, points also to the fact
that by the act of September 8, 1916, chapter 463, section 12, subsection
second, subdivision c (39 Stat., 756, 768), the rule for computing gross income
there provided for mutual fire insurance companies was made applicable to
mutual employers’ liability, mutual workmen’s compensation, and mutual
casualty insurance companies. It asserts that thereby congress has mani
fested a settled policy to treat the taxable income of mutual concerns as not
including premium refunds; and that if mutual life insurance companies are
not permitted to “exclude” them, these companies will be the only mutual
concerns which are thus discriminated against. Casualty insurance in its
various forms, like fire and marine insurance, provides only protection, and
the premium is wholly an expense. If such later legislation could be con
sidered in construing the act of 1913, the conclusion to be drawn from it
would be clearly the opposite of that urged. The latter act would tend to
show that congress persists in its determination to differentiate between life
and other forms of insurance.
Fourth. It is urged that in order to sustain the interpretation given to
the noninclusion clause by the circuit court of appeals (which was, in effect,
the interpretation set forth above), it is necessary to interpolate in the clause
the words “within such year,” as shown in italics in brackets, thus:
And life insurance companies shall not include as income in any year
such portion of any actual premiums received from any individual policyholder [within such year] as shall have been paid back or credited to such
individual policyholder, or treated as an abatement of premium of such
individual policyholder, within such year.
What has been said above shows that no such interpolation is necessary
to sustain the construction given by the circuit court of appeals. That court
did not hold that the permitted noninclusion from the year’s gross income is
limited to that portion of the premium received within the year, which by
reason of a dividend is paid back within the same year. What the court
held was that the noninclusion is limited to that portion of the premium
which, although entered on the books as received, was not actually received
within the year, because the full premium was by means of the dividend either
reduced or otherwise wiped out to that extent. Nor does the government
contend that any portion of a premium not received within the tax year shall
be included in computing the year’s gross income. On the other hand, what
the company is seeking is not to have “nonincluded” a part of the premiums
which were actually received within the year or which appear as matter of
bookkeeping to have been received but actually were not. It is seeking to
have the aggregate of premiums actually received within the year reduced
by an amount which the company paid out within the year, and which it paid
out mainly on account of premiums received long before the tax year. What
it seeks is not a noninclusion of amounts paid in—but a deduction of amounts
paid out.
If the terms of the noninclusion clause (c) above, standing alone, per
mitted of a doubt as to its proper construction, the doubt would disappear
when it is read in connection with the deduction clause (d) above. The
deduction there prescribed is of “the sums other than dividends paid within
the year on policy and annuity contracts.” This is tantamount to a direction
that dividends shall not be deducted. It was argued that the dividends there
referred to are “commercial” dividends like those upon capital stock, and
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that those here involved are dividends of a different character. But the
dividends which the deduction clause says in effect shall not be deducted are
the very dividends here in question—that is, dividends “on policy and annuity
contracts.” None such may be deducted by any insurance company except
as expressly provided for in the act in clauses quoted above (a), (b) and
(c)—that is, clauses (a), (b) and (c) are in effect exceptions to the
general exclusion of dividends from the permissible deductions as prescribed
in clause (d) above.
In support of the company’s contention that the interpolation of the
words “within the year” is necessary in order to support the construction
given to the act by the circuit court of appeals we are asked to consider the
legislative history of the revenue act of 1918 (enacted Feb. 24, 1919, c. 18, 40
Stat., 1057) ; and specifically to the fact that in the bill as introduced in and
passed by the house the corresponding section, 233 (a), contained the words
“within the taxable year,” and that these words were stricken out by the
conference committee (report No. 1037, sixty-fifth congress, third session).
The legislative history of an act may, where the meaning of the words used
is doubtful, be resorted to as an aid to construction. (Caminetti v. United
States, 242 U. S., 470, 490.) But no aid could possibly be derived from the
legislative history of another act passed nearly six years after the one in
question. Further answer to the argument based on the legislative history
of the later act would therefore be inappropriate.
We find no error in the judgment of the circuit court of appeals. It is
affirmed.
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